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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

STOLING
BY CSN 12-20
SUBJECT : Remarks concerning my relationship with American Intelligence during
the past ten years

SOURCE : ARCAPELIN/1

REPORT DATE: 23 July 1956

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BY DOI 70-17

1. During the previous contact with my American Intelligence contact (TW: henceforth referred to as CO - Case Officer), I was asked to give some critical comments concerning my collaboration with the American intelligence service. I accepted this proposition very gladly, especially since June 1956 marked the tenth year of my service with representatives of American intelligence which began with "Mister Novak" and "Uncle Tom". During this 10-year period, I worked with about 12 different CO's, over a longer period of time with some than others. It is about time that criticism should be made of my relationship with the Americans. I can make some criticisms on the basis of my six-year collaboration with the German Abwehr during World War II. I must note that my criticisms will not be concerning the efforts of the AIS, since I have no understanding on this topic. My criticisms will be only of the people with whom I have collaborated. Also, I have no intention of criticizing this or that individual with whom I have met. However, when necessary, I will name one or another pseudonym.

2. BASIC FACTORS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION: Every effort, especially the intelligence effort, makes sense only when it is successful, and success in the intelligence effort is based on the following factors:

A. Necessary clandestinity of the actual intelligence effort and all who participate. This includes the CO's and the "collaborators" who make up the whole.

B. Selection of personnel for the intelligence effort. This means personnel with intelligence, their knowledge of a given task (in which they participate), with desirable personal characteristics, i.e., respectability, a sincere desire to work in intelligence, objectivity and the ability to make necessary conclusions or analyses, etc. I consider professionalism to be among the most important factors which contributes to the success of the intelligence effort.

C. Faith and Confidence. This goes both ways, i.e., from the CO to the collaborator and vice versa. For me, this is the "alpha and omega" of the intelligence effort. There can be no success or harmonious collaboration without mutual faith. Faith must be gained through common effort, through a fostering of common interests, common friendships and relationships and through other means. It is natural for some people not to have this mutual faith. This is especially true with people who work in the intelligence field where it is standard operational procedure to keep a secret and to be on their guard at all times. This is completely understandable; however, without mutual faith there cannot exist a successful effort.

D. Truthfulness of data, their proper interpretation, etc., are also factors necessary for the successful intelligence effort.

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3. Now, I would like to go into detail on the above points.

A. Clandestinity of our collaboration: I can say nothing against the clandestinity of our collaboration during the past ten years. I, personally have no qualifications to make any critical remarks about such and leave it up to American Headquarters. The clandestinity of our collaboration is even overdone in some forms, overdone in the sense that steps are taken to protect and cover me along just about every step of the line. During the course of my collaboration with the Americans, I can say that I cannot identify by name any of the persons with whom I have worked; I can supply only the "pseudonyms, and then, only the first name, i.e., "Robert", "Stefan", "John", "Pavlo", and others. Further, our relationship has been so clandestine that I cannot identify the organization which employs me, much less its location. I do not know if I am employed by CIC, MIS, FBI, OSI or what have you.

If conspiracy is carried out so rigorously for practical reasons, i.e., only for the sake of conspiracy, then everything is in order. However, if it is influenced for reasons of disbelief, then this is a negative factor in our collaboration.

During the past ten years, there have been only one or two occasions on which I could comment concerning clandestinity as related to me personally. When I reported on them, it was clarified to me that these so-called non-conspiratorial instances did not, in fact, take place and were the results of intrigues on the part of other persons. For instance, in 1950, Myron MATVIYENKO and Ivan KASHUBA told me that the Americans were alleged to have told Yaroslav SULIMA (now deceased) that they (the Americans) had detailed and objective information concerning the BANDERAites which originated with a priest who is oriented in such affairs. MATVIYENKO and KASHUBA deduced that the priest could have been only I. Then there was the time when I met with "John" at a tavern near Nymphenburg and we were spotted by an unidentified German, a friend of Boris LEVITSKY, who later informed LEVITSKY that some BANDERAite with a beard spoke with another man at a tavern concerning LEVITSKY. However, this disturbance of our security was not one on which blame can be placed on either "John" or me. I can say that during the past ten years clandestinity and security was maintained throughout and carried out to the point where today I cannot identify the outfit for which I work. If it has been influenced by, and maintained for, the intelligence effort, then everything is in order. However, if it has been influenced by disbelief in me, then something should be done about it. Most important is that I should be assured that this is done for this or that reason and the affair should not be left unclearified.

B. Responsible selection of personnel for the intelligence effort: I am not able to offer much criticism on this topic. However, on the basis of my observation, I can say only that just about all of the people with whom I have worked have had the solid basis for carrying out the effort. All apparently had intelligence training and some undoubtedly had long experience. However, frequent changes in case officers, at least during the initial phase of each CO's period with me, indicated that the efforts of many CO's in the Ukrainian field in Europe and Germany were new and not always were they acquainted with the Ukrainian scene and problems involved. Specific and general

situations were completely foreign to them; for example, there were times when some of the case officers were not acquainted with the difference between UNVR and ZPUNVR, OUN and ECh/OUN, etc. It should be noted that subsequently everyone of them filled in the gaps of this type of background knowledge. This positive factor was true with all of them, either as the result of their Ukrainian background or as the result of their ultimate orientation with Ukrainian problems; they soon became experts in Ukrainian emigre activities.

When the topic is switched to my suitability for this job, then I would find myself in a very difficult situation. I say this for the following reasons:

(1) Not one of my case officers has given me an assessment of my efforts. I am not aware whether or not headquarters is satisfied with my work. I do not consider myself to be a great specialist in this activity. I know only that all of my efforts are sincere and that I can accomplish only that which circumstances permit. For human reasons, it would be much better for me personally if I would know that headquarters is happy with my work, that my efforts have achieved at least minimum success. I would be very grateful if criticisms would be offered periodically concerning my efforts. I certainly would not condemn anyone for criticisms; in fact, I think that such is necessary and I would be very thankful for it.

(2) I can only deduce that my efforts have been satisfactory. My deductions are based on the fact that I have not been released from employment and that my salary has been raised periodically. I do not desire light or cheap compliments or undeserved credit. However, it would be more profitable to me and my "growth" in the intelligence field if an assessment were given to me periodically.

I would like to point out that, during my service with the Abwehr, my superiors made objective criticisms of all employees on an annual basis. This criticism was given either orally or written. If the criticism was favorable, then it gave the person the strength and desire to achieve greater successes and in this manner mobilized us that much more toward the effort. If the criticism was negative, then it forced us to set ourselves down to task in order to obtain a more favorable criticism the next year. Likewise, while we were on the front, every one of our achievements was recognized by a citation which was read before the entire group.

9. Faith and Confidence: As I earlier indicated, the fundamental basis of the intelligence effort from the point of view of achievement is mutual trust. Perhaps my evaluation is incorrect; however, for some reason I am convinced, and this conviction has been with me for the past number of years, that we have not found common ground on the point of trust. This has been the most grievous subject during the past ten years of our collaboration. I do not wish to say that there was no trust from the side of my superiors; perhaps there was. However, I have been convinced the whole time that it did not exist. I base my conviction on the following circumstances:

(1) In the course of evaluating the necessary clandestineness which has been placed on our intelligence effort, I have always been convinced that my American friends have exaggerated it and have gone overboard in the conspiratorial conduct of our contacts. After becoming convinced that it was exaggerated, then I had to ask myself: why was it exaggerated. And I became further convinced that perhaps it was based on distrust in me. Concretely: Until today, I do not know for whom I work, I cannot identify by name one person with whom I have worked, I do not have any guarantee that, should our relationship suddenly be terminated at the initiative of the Americans, I could meet with the Americans and have a sincere discussion with the Americans. Permit me to spell this out hypothetically: if I do not receive a phone call over a period of time, I telephone the Americans and I am informed that my case officer is not around and no one desires to speak with me; all contact is cut off. Who could vouch for me or to whom could I prove that I was employed with the Americans. No one and I to no one. This actually happened during my relationship with [redacted] when he did not telephone me for about two weeks, I took the initiative and rang him but a girl told me that he was not in. I telephoned again in four weeks, then again in six weeks. When I telephoned in two months, I was told that [redacted] was gone. Much later, I was recontacted by another American.

(2) During about 1951, I was informed that I would be advanced to the status as an "assistant" and that my salary would be raised accordingly. Further, on this occasion and on two other occasions (one earlier and one later), I was told that I would be given a contract to sign and that this contract would stipulate all terms of our relationship. I have yet to see or sign such a contract. Likewise, during the same period, I was told that I (and my former common law wife) could take a vacation on the Chinese and that all expenses would be reimbursed on my return. I took the vacation (and it rained, by the way); however, when I returned, I was not reimbursed but was told that headquarters refused to grant the reimbursement, etc. Now what should I think about a situation like that. My only recourse was to think that there existed no trust in me. Under the guarantee of a written contract, I would know what "firm" employs me, even if the name of the firm did not appear but was indicated in one form or another.

(3) The item of distrust, better yet, the complex number of items of distrust in me has grown in strength during the past number of years. One such item appeared during the Boris LEVITSKY affair. I must underline the fact that I made my contribution in this instance most sincerely and most respectfully. As it was, during contacts with case officers in this affair, it seemed that the American investigation was not bent against LEVITSKY but against me, the informant. This happened so often that I lost all ambition to continue. Occasionally, I had thoughts which told me that I should not report further on the affair to which I had direct access and which was as interesting as the LEVITSKY affair. I asked myself: why should I report further when my superiors, instead of delving into the affair itself, concentrated their attention on why I am reporting

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on this or that hides behind my reporting, perhaps they were thinking that I may have been doing this at someone else's instruction. I considered it my duty to report on this affair. At the same time, I did not find (it seemed to me) any understanding in my chiefs.

(4) All of my CO's with few exceptions, did not do anything to erase this distrust between one person and another, especially in my case, an intelligence informant. This could have been achieved in a diverse number of ways, e.g., closer fellowship, discussions, etc. In this, I point out that I do not wish to disturb the basis for clandestine relationship. Personally, I became accustomed earlier to another style of intelligence cooperation. The degree of amiability and friendly relationship between me and my Abwehr superiors was such that we had nothing to hide before one or another. Our relationship, beyond the actual job, was that of a best friend to a best friend. I dare say that all which the Americans attempt to achieve through the assistance of LOFLUTTER, that is: non-living object or, in a sense, a debasement of humanity, was achieved much more so by the Germans through amiable and friendly relationships with us. Here, it must be noted that we Slavonic people are very sensitive and emotional and, therefore, vulnerable and easily hurt.

During my Abwehr service, if I, or if one of my friends, married or otherwise, associated with girls, or became drunk to insensibility, or if we visited (pardon the word) a whore-house, or if we did anything "abnormal" or something along this line, we had no need to hide this fact and keep quiet about it. On the contrary, we would talk about it without shame to all of our superiors. The superiors knew about all such things. They would laugh about it and, if necessary, caution us about repeating it or give us a piece of advice, etc. The superiors created such a friendly atmosphere that all of us became, as it were, a whole. There was nothing which one person had which he felt should be excluded from another. This type of atmosphere gave birth not only to mutual personal respect but mutual trust which was necessary for the intelligence endeavor.

Therefore, today, after 12 years have passed and I have not met with my old Abwehr chiefs, they still remain in my memory as they were then, i.e., not only friends but best friends. I feel the need to meet with them, to talk things over with them, to learn about their current activities, their joys and sorrows, because they are my joys and sorrows.

Still another important item: our German superiors never considered our collaboration in the sense of "agenture or salaried". Neither money nor promise of a good life or career entered into the picture and was not the motivating force for our efforts with the Abwehr. We served with the Abwehr because we were convinced that we were serving against an evil which was Bolshevism. The Germans understood human relationships and moral perceptions of the individual and were able to strengthen us and never permitted us to believe that we were ordinary, paid, untrusted agents. They always told us: a paid agent will work for an intelligence service until the other side pays him more and gives him the possibility of living better. However, intelligence work uses ideologically-motivated people who see a living and patriotic value in their intelligence effort.

per CSH 43-26

ligence. Very is the means to the end and not the end in itself. The German taught us not to place value in money. And this was good. We had more money available to us with the Germans than I today, as an AIS collaborator. However, I very seldom used the money which was designated for my effort. Often, I used only about 50 percent of the funds which were allotted to me. I could have used up 100 percent of the funds and even without accounting for it later. However, with the ideological approach to the affair, all of us matured, educated ourselves and strengthened our characters.

4. Returning to the subject of my collaboration with American IS, I say sorrowfully that our relationship, from its inception until today, has carried the characteristic of a "business". The basis for our collaboration is this: we have the money and we pay you; you do not have a completely dumb head; therefore, give us the information which we need. The human aspects or all that we can call the spiritual elements of our collaboration, automatically come under the heading of a second, if not a third, plan. When one of my superiors brought me 10 cartons of cigarettes, then he felt it proper to say, "I give you more cigarettes this time because you gave us more information this time".

5. This, in my estimation, is the businessman's area which I mentioned earlier. Because I gave more information than was usual, the case officer gave me a CARE package, perhaps worth about 10 US dollars, or 10 cartons of cigarettes which probably were worth about 15 US dollars. The case officer did not place the value of information in the moral category but in the category of the CARE package or 10 cartons of cigarettes. This automatically placed me in the category of "paid low-level spitsel". I fought this degradation of the human individual with all the forces which I could master, degradation from the state as a human, as an intelligent person, as a former political and underground activist to the condition of a "paid spitsel". Cognizant of earlier Abwehr instructions (as described above), my blood boiled and I became angry at the thought that possibly I was being treated similarly in this case, that I was not obtaining the proper respect, etc.

6. Let's review our "operational meetings" during the past 10 years. They have been various. However, most of them took place as following: we meet as pre-arranged, shake hands after saying, "Hello" or "Good day" (Dobryden). Then the case officer would say, "What's new" (Shcho chuvaty). After making my reply, I would pull out some reports from my brief case and read them, clearing up a few points in the reports and answering a few questions and, here and there, I was offered American cigarette. This entire transaction took about an hour or two. When all was completed, we asked one another, "Do you have any further questions?" If not, we arranged the next meeting, shook hands and departed from one another. There was nothing human (lyudake) about these meetings, there was no friendship, amiability, etc. It was a typical businessman's transaction. I provided the information and you paid me at the end of the month. It is my thought that this has been a serious negative aspect during the course of our 10 year collaboration. Please do not misunderstand me. This is not always the case. However, a system or routine remains the same, even though a change may occur periodically. In this form of collaboration, a person automatically becomes a robot, without a soul, without a moral basis. It brings forth undesirable complexes, it forces a person to lose his individuality and, worst of all, it makes a person a "paid agent". In order to rid one's self of

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this role, one has to go through a series of inner conflicts and one has to tell one's self that the situation is different than what it actually appears to be.

7. This has created an unpleasant situation for me. All case officers who have worked for me, with one or two exceptions, have remained nothing but cold, spiritless pseudonyms. I have nothing in common with them. I do not care where they are located today, what they are doing, how they are getting along, etc. Aside from the "business", we had nothing in common. They have left nothing for my memory to recall. We were unable to find friendly association, sociability or that person-to-person relationship. We lacked that solid moral basis of intelligence collaboration. I did not deem it necessary to open my soul to them, just as they kept their souls closed to me. I knew that, in a year or two, they would look into my soul with the aid of LCFLUTTER and then the end would come. Perhaps LCFLUTTER is an ideal invention. However, my dear friends, it will never replace that sincerity and truthfulness which grows on the base of mutual trust, on the base of fellowship, amiable extra-curricular associations, common effort and endeavor toward one and the same goal.

8. Having read the above, the reader will say: "be more objective and admit that you yourself to a great degree were responsible for lack of harmony about which you write, that you kept quiet about various important circumstances, that your wife lived somewhere beyond Germany and that S is not your wife. We had the right not to have trust in you when your wife arrived in Munich from the East Zone. Your silence meant that you could keep quiet about something else which may be more important to us." At first glance, this argument would be completely correct and supported by fact. Distrust in me was in order. However, let us analyze this situation, keeping in mind the old Roman saying, Sine ira et studio.

9. It is a fact that, until June 1954, I remained silent about the existence of my wife. I made a secret of this. However, this was not an absolute secret. It was something which I wanted to keep secret as a matter of principle. It was a secret which I kept from you and the rest of your compatriots. However, this was not principally my secret which I safeguarded. On the contrary, this has been no secret to all my friends with whom I have friendly contacts, with whom I have trust and who have repaid me with their trust. I discussed all of this with them, sought their counsel and poured out all of my troubles relative to this unpleasant situation. Those who are aware of this situation include Colonel SCHAMLSCHLAEGER, Walter ZINECKER, Ivan KASHUBA, Borys LEVITSKYI, Myron MATVIYENKO and his wife, Gena MATVIYENKO, the FYLIPOVICHs and a whole group of others. I kept no secrets from them. I knew that they would understand when I would relate it to them and that they would continue their trust in me and would continue their friendly relationships with me.

10. This means, in effect, that I did not make this a particular secret. Should there have been a relationship between us as there was between me and the Abwehr, then believe me, this would have been the first topic which I would have revealed to your organization. We were unable to create such an atmosphere during the course of our collaboration. The basis of our relationship, i.e., the businessman's relationship, did not lead to the point where I could open up my soul to you, especially when I saw that all of my case officers kept to themselves and did not

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interest themselves in my affairs except in matters of ordinary business. Had I an inkling that my case officers were living my life that my life beyond ordinary business was of interest to them, had I seen that they did not rely completely on LCFLUTTER and that they took into account the soul and spirit of a person which does not reveal itself only on LCFLUTTER but in fellowship, I certainly would not have kept any secrets from you just as I did not keep secrets from my friends. I underline this and take full responsibility for my statements. I would have done it without considering I who did not deserve to be placed in a position of shame or degradation. I would have done it even when my respect as a priest, who is generally known and respected as a priest among people, would have been questioned.

11. Should the above arguments not be sufficient, then I could only do the following:

(1) I say under an oath that, until June 1954, I had no information either direct or indirect, concerning M. I did not know that she was to be found in the Soviet zone.

(2) As early as 1945, M's sisters and father stated that an unidentified German woman informed them that M died during a bombardment. They were convinced of this and they informed me of their conviction.

This was one of the moments which did not permit me to believe that she was dead. I related all that I knew about M and did not conceal anything.

12. Not blaming my silence on anyone and accepting the full responsibility concerning my silence about M, I only wish to underline the fact that I and my superiors are responsible, to a degree, for my silence. We did not obtain an atmosphere of sincerity nor create a situation in which we could have trust.

13. I do not know which path our collaboration will take in the future. However, I would like to underline one fact: should we continue our collaboration and create an atmosphere of mutual trust, then both sides have to review our mutual positions which have existed until now. We must remove all of that which hinders trust and introduce to the fore that within us which will create a whole which will live one life and which will be guided toward one goal.

14. Investigation of American IS "associates" with the assistance of LCFLUTTER: There are various methods to investigate the truthfulness of people. American IS takes advantage of LCFLUTTER. It was explained to me that LCFLUTTER is required by the Americans as a routine item. If it is a routine thing, then it is evident that I have nothing to say against it and I do not want to criticize this aspect. My criticisms are made only so that my superiors would know what I think about this method in order that there exist no misunderstanding between us.

15. Investigation of a person with the assistance of LCFLUTTER is based on the voluntary consent of that person. No one is forced to undergo this type of investigation. I believe that in our case, the voluntary aspect of this thing is lost since, once it is required, then one cannot speak of anything being voluntary. It is true that anyone who is subjected to this treatment has the right to refuse it. However, refusal is tantamount to a person automatically falling under suspicion since that person refuses to undergo treatment because he is afraid that something secret will be revealed. That is logical. I am not aware how the Americans would

treat a person who would refuse to accept this treatment. I am personally convinced that this person sooner or later would lose his job. There would be many reasons for this; however, I could be mistaken. If I am mistaken, then I would be grateful if I would be counseled on this topic.

16. Voluntary acceptance of this treatment is absolutely wrong in the case of LCFLUTTER since even he who accepts this treatment voluntarily accepts it for moral reasons. He accepts it because he does not wish to fall under suspicion because of some secret which he hides and because he does not know what will be the result if he refuses to submit to this type of investigation. Undoubtedly the reply to my statement will be: your logic is without foundation because every person who has nothing to hide will submit to the treatment and will not make such a grandiose issue of it. I can only offer this as a reply:

A. Even the idea of LCFLUTTER presupposes the individual to think that his superiors maintain some distrust in him.

B. The superiors believe that they can find the objective truth and assessment of character and truthfulness only with the aid of LCFLUTTER since all other methods have been unsuccessful.


C. The questions which are asked at times during the course of LCFLUTTER is equal to lowering a person's dignity. It should not be forgotten that every person has his self-respect, his ambition. When self-respect in a person is disturbed in one way or another, when ambition is irritated, then a person feels that an injustice has been incurred, he feels that he has been wronged and becomes angry at those who enforce this tactic even if there is a moral basis for it.

This is my conviction. I would be grateful if my superiors would accept the fact that such and such perceptions are created in them when they themselves experienced this treatment. I believe that they will accept my thoughts. However, I do not have the intention to speak against it....I merely take leave of the line that I have no right to criticize it if it is a requirement. I hope that my comments above will not be viewed as criticism but as a free phrasing of my thoughts which I openly make about this affair. My criticisms are made only in reference to the actual methods of investigation via LCFLUTTER. However, a criticism of the methods does not necessarily mean elimination of comments on the basis of the actual investigation. I have undergone LCFLUTTER twice. On both occasions, the investigation took place with the assistance of two different elements. The first LCFLUTTER, in my belief, was the most concrete and successful. Because it was conducted in the way it was, its methods reduced my self-respect only to a minimum strength, it made me unhappy only to a minimum degree. It took place in the following manner: my CO explained to me the basis for this type of investigation and sent me to a specific address. There I found a very sympathetic man who, in private discussion, gave me a further explanation and made the proposal that I offer to accept this type of investigation or control. He underlined the fact that occasionally he will ask difficult questions but that this was only a formal method of investigation. During the first LCFLUTTER, not one of my American acquaintances was present, i.e., people with whom I worked until and including that moment. My superiors did not say anything to me about this topic during the course of the preliminary investigation. One of them merely mentioned, "Perhaps you will be unhappy with this machine; however, everyone of us has to go through the same method". It goes with

saying that questions were of a type which had to be listed by my COs or by those who handled my information. I found everything to be in order.

17. However, the second LCFLUTTER came about under different circumstances. I was informed several months earlier that I would undergo another LCFLUTTER. I consented to it. Shortly thereafter, I was informed again that I would soon be LCFLUTTERed. No time or place was mentioned. Then, when I arrived at the meeting site for a pre-arranged meeting, I was told that I would undergo LCFLUTTER at that moment. I was taken by surprise since I was not prepared, morally, for this affair. However, I gave my consent, despite everything. You can imagine my astonishment when I saw that LCFLUTTER was effected in the presence of the person with whom I worked for the past year or so. This was a novelty and I found this to be very untactful on the part of my CO who wanted to be present during the course of LCFLUTTER. This was a mistake from the psychological point of view. I felt an unsympathetic feeling even if only for that reason. My feelings were stirred even further when my CO, who not only was present, but began to ask the LCFLUTTER questions. From the text of the questions, I considered that he personally made up the questions, corrected the questions as he went along and then asked the questions. This method of investigation not only aroused my anger but called within me a protest, an inner anger, a moral depression, indignance and disrespect for him, personally. I repeat: this was an error from the psychological point of view. The CO who had direct contact with me should not have been present at that LCFLUTTER. He could have formulated the questions, which he did and he could have made up hundreds of other questions which were of interest to him. However, he should not have dared to have been present. On the basis of the results of the questions and private discussion with the person who physically operated the LCFLUTTER, he could have asked other questions or could have repeated the questions. However, to ask the questions and to hear the answers was a very untactful measure. I stated earlier that among the majority of my COs I did not find one CO (perhaps it was my personal fault) with whom I could have worked in close associative contact. In every case we knew very little about one another or the CO was not very well acquainted with me as a private individual. The methods of investigation, as were true of the last LCFLUTTER, tore away even the weak associative contacts which we were able to reach during the number of years. I suspect that the CO who assisted at the last LCFLUTTER will read my comments. I even want him to read them. I make these comments not to reproach him. I state only facts and do this only because I do not want this error to repeat itself, i.e., to reach the same results without my CO being present. I hope that he does not take these comments personally. I am personally convinced that he absolutely did not want to create any unpleasantness for me. On the contrary, I am certain that he, knowing my mother tongue, probably wanted to help me understand the text and sense of the questions. However, all of his good intentions went to naught.

18. To sum up the above, I make the following statement: When American IS takes the position that investigation of its "associates" must take place with assistance of LCFLUTTER, then that investigation must be effected with methods which will reduce human respect to the smallest degree possible. That form of investigation should not be carried out and the questions should not be posed by, those people who have contact with those who submit to LCFLUTTER; only those who are strange to the one who will be LCFLUTTERed should ask the questions. Investigation with the assistance of LCFLUTTER should strengthen the relationship between CO and the "associate" and never should the association be destroyed by an imprudent tactic.



The friendly, moral nature of the contact between the CO and "associate" is the preliminary condition to success of every intelligence effort. Perhaps people who have been reared according to Western culture react to this affair differently than we Slavonic people. If this is true, then the above is related only to the Slavonic people.

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UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 325 HD/JL/12-1
24 JUL 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MUNICH

ACTION: SR 1-4

INFO : COP 5, CI 6, CI/OPS 7, FI 8, FI/OPS 9, EE 10-11, S/C 12-13

DESENSITIZED
BY DOI 70-17

25 JUL 56

CAPLIN

MUNI 4926 (IN 45953)

2233Z 24 JUL 56

ROUTINE

TO DIR

INFO FRAN

PRECEDENCE
CITE MUNI

EDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEBATH

DIR 21452 (OUT 65781) ✓

1. FEEL SUBJ'S VALUE TO MOB AS REPORTER LIKE SCENE, PROVIDING INFO NECESSARY IN SUPPORT AND DOUBLE CHECK DA CASES, AND FURNISHING LEADS MAKES ADVISABLE RETAIN HIM MUNI. FEEL HIS VALUE IN GENERAL CE SUPPORT INCREASING AND VIEW FACT HE NOW WELL ESTABLISHED HERE FEEL HE IN POSITION MAKE MUCH GREATER KUBARK CONTRIBUTION MUNI THAN ELSEWHERE. AT PRESENT FEEL HIS REPORTING ON AECANDIOT IS SECONDARY, BUT FORESEE NO PROBLEM HIS CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP. NOTE SUBJ PERSONALLY PREFERS REMAIN MUNI, SINCE FEELS CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE HERE.

2. POUCHING FURTHER COMMENTS. REQUEST PROCESS REQUEST MUNI 4785 (IN 40170)

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

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JUL 25 1956